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Abstract
Using a laboratory experiment, we identify whether decision makers con-
sider it a mistake to violate canonical choice axioms. To do this, we incentivize
subjects to report which of several axioms they want their decisions to satisfy.
Then, subjects make lottery choices which might conflict with their stated axiom
preferences. We give them the opportunity to re-evaluate their decisions when
lotteries conflict with desired axioms. We find that a majority of individuals
want to follow the axioms and revise their lottery choices to be consistent with
them. We interpret this to mean that most axiom violations in our sample were
mistakes.
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In reversing my preference... I have
corrected an error. There is, of
course, an important sense in which
preferences, being entirely
subjective, cannot be in error; but in
a different, more subtle sense they
can be.
Leonard Savage (1954)
I. INTRODUCTION
An enormous experimental literature—spanning at least six decades—has shown
that individuals consistently violate the canonical axioms in decision theory.1 How-
ever, it is not clear from the literature whether these violations are intentional devi-
ations from the axioms or are simply mistakes. While it is obvious that these viola-
tions demonstrate that the theory is not descriptively accurate, it could be the case
that the theory is still normatively appealing to the decision makers. An individual
who wants to follow an axiom might just find it difficult to make choices that are
reliably consistent with the axiom. When an individual violates an axiom but would
not have done so had they known they were violating the axiom, we call the viola-
tion a mistake. If violations of canonical axioms stem mainly from mistakes, then
we can retain the normative content of the theory. However, if an individual violates
the axioms because they do not want to follow them, then one should look for other
“behavioral axioms” that the individual agrees with.
In this paper, we report results from the first incentivized experiment designed to
detect mistakes when individuals violate axioms in the domain of risk. The difficulty
in detecting a mistake is that it requires two pieces of information in addition to the
choice data collected in standard experiments: knowledge of the axioms an individual
wants to follow and observation of how individuals reconcile lottery choice and axioms
when they conflict. By directly and incentive-compatibly eliciting these two missing
pieces of information, we provide a general method to detect the “subtle sense” in
which individuals make mistakes as mentioned by Savage (1954).
1Examples include May (1954); MacCrimmon (1968); Tversky (1969); Slovic and Tversky (1974);
Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Huber et al. (1982); Segal (1988); Loomes et al. (1991); Wedell (1991);
Loomes et al. (1992); Camerer (1995); Birnbaum and Chavez (1997); Seidl (2002); Birnbaum and
Martin (2003); Birnbaum and Schmidt (2008); Regenwetter et al. (2011); Birnbaum et al. (2016),
among many others.
2
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3481381
To accomplish this, our experiment has three main parts. First, we elicit the ax-
ioms a subject wants to follow by presenting the axioms as “decision rules” for making
risky choices. In particular, subjects choose whether to have the rule select lotteries
for them or whether they want to make the lottery choices on their own. Subjects
then face standard binary decision problems in which the axioms are routinely vio-
lated. Our main focus is on subjects who want to follow an axiom but violate it when
making lottery choices. To observe how subjects perceive this inconsistency, we give
them the opportunity to re-evaluate their decisions when lottery choices conflict with
the axioms they want to follow. If the axioms remain normatively appealing, then
subjects should change their lottery choices to conform to the axioms. If an axiom
does not remain normatively appealing in the face of a violation, then subjects should
abandon the axiom as a decision rule. In short, we are able to identify mistakes—
whereby individuals reconcile axioms and lotteries to be consistent—separately from
deliberate violations. Not only can we see when a mistake occurs, but we can see,
from the subject’s own perspective, whether the mistake was in the axiom choice or
in the lottery choice.
We focus on six fundamental axioms in the domain of risk—independence of ir-
relevant alternatives, first order stochastic dominance, transitivity, independence,
branch independence, and consistency, though we emphasize that our methods could
be applied to any axioms. We find that subjects ex-ante want to follow these axioms
at high rates—around 85% of subjects desire their choices to be consistent with each
of the six axioms. However, as in previous experiments, subjects often violate these
axioms in their lottery choices.2 We give subjects the opportunity to reconcile their
axiom and lottery choices when inconsistent. Subjects can make their choices con-
sistent either by changing their lottery decisions or by declaring they no longer want
their choices to obey the axiom. Subjects revise about 70% of inconsistent choices,
and of these revisions, about 80% change their lottery choices to be consistent with
the axioms. We interpret this as subjects treating the axioms as normative and view-
ing their lottery choices as mistakes.
Our results provide compelling evidence that subjects prefer to choose in accor-
dance with many of the canonical axioms of decision theory. However, a major con-
cern when eliciting whether a subject wants to follow a rule is the presence of exper-
imenter demand effects. In particular, a subject in the experiment may believe that
2As we discuss in section III, we intentionally chose questions to induce violations.
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the experimenter is only offering rules which are helpful to them or that inconsisten-
cies between rules and lotteries should be reconciled in favor of the rules. To prevent
this confound from driving the results, we also present the subjects with not axioms
(¬axioms). The ¬axioms were designed to be the “opposite” of our main axioms. For
example, we present subjects with the rule ¬transitivity, which says, “If A is pre-
ferred to B and B is preferred to C, then C is preferred to A.” We use the rates at
which subjects select and reconcile these axioms as a benchmark for results on the
main axioms of interest.
We find that subjects are much less likely to select the ¬axioms, doing so only
about 10% of the time. This confirms that subjects are not simply following the
axioms due to experimenter demand effect. Furthermore, when subjects reconcile
choices that are inconsistent with the ¬axioms, they are more likely to revise the
conflict by abandoning the ¬axiom rather than by altering their lottery choices to
conform to the ¬axiom. In doing so, they reveal that following the ¬axiom was the
mistake, rather than their lottery choices. This is in stark contrast to the axioms,
where a majority of lottery choices are revised to be consistent with the axiom.
In addition to identifying mistakes, this paper contributes to a sparse literature on
how individuals perceive axioms. There are two main branches of this literature, de-
pending on whether the axioms are explicitly stated to subjects or not. In our paper,
the axioms are explicitly stated and elicited as preferences. The closest papers with
explicit axioms are MacCrimmon (1968), Slovic and Tversky (1974), and MacCrim-
mon and Larsson (1979). However, these studies do not incentivize the participants
and do not elicit whether the individuals ex-ante want to follow the axiom. These
studies also do not control for demand effects and even try to induce them in some
cases. Thus, the results in our paper are the first to show, in an incentivized setting
controlling for demand effects, that there is normative appeal to canonical axioms
that are used to model risk preferences. In the branch of the literature where the ax-
ioms are not explicitly stated, but the choices are designed to elicit attitudes towards
the axioms, the closest paper is Benjamin et al. (2019).3 They also attempt to ad-
dress demand effects and allow for reconciliation of choices. However, the questions
in their paper were designed to be directly applicable to questions about life-cycle
saving so the choices could not be incentivized. We describe these related studies in
more detail and additional literature in Section V.
3A version of this appeared earlier in Fontana (2015).
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Finally, we view our paper partially as a methodological contribution and proof of
concept that opens the door to a number of future research directions. Researchers
can use our experimental paradigm to elicit the normative appeal of—and identify
mistakes in implementing—axioms, strategies, social choice rules, and many other
objects of interest. We purposefully chose simple axioms to study, but one could easily
use a similar procedure to study more complicated axioms such as reduction of com-
pound lotteries, the weak axiom of revealed preference, dynamic consistency, time
stationarity, among many others. In strategic games, one could use this methodology
to elicit whether individuals view obeying dominant strategies and best-responding
to beliefs as normative principles for different games, even if they fail to do so suc-
cessfully in practice. Researchers could also elicit attitudes toward fairness or aggre-
gation rules in the domain of social preferences. In the case of impossibility theorems
(e.g. Arrow, 1950), these methods could be used to identify which axioms are the most
desirable to relax or abandon. In this way, we view the methods here as a paradigm
that can be transplanted to inform other areas of economics.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Before outlining the experimental design, we define the theoretical framework un-
derlying the experiment. We presented all questions and axioms in the domain of
non-negative monetary lotteries. We considered lotteries with US dollars as prizes,
with potential outcomes in X = [0,30]. We represent the set of lotteries with prizes
in X by ∆(X ), with strict preferences Â defined over ∆(X ). We denote generic prizes
in X by x, y, z, and denote generic lotteries in ∆(X ) by p, q, r, s. We represent the
degenerate lottery giving $x for sure as δx. Lastly, for a set of lotteries, S, we denote
the set of lotteries chosen from S as C(S). We write p Â q to mean p = C({p, q}), or p
is chosen from the set of {p, q}.
Throughout the experiment, we study six fundamental axioms:
1. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): p = C({p, q, r})⇒ p = C({p, q})
IIA states that if a lottery p is chosen from the set of lotteries p, q and r, then
it is also chosen from the subset p and q.
2. First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD):4 ∀x 1−P(x)≥ 1−Q(x) ⇒ p Â q
4Where P(x) and Q(x) are the cumulative distribution functions to x of p and q respectively. For
example, P(x)=∑y≤x p(y) where p(y) if the probability of winning prize y.
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FOSD states that if the probability of winning a prize greater than x is higher
in p than in q, for all prizes, then p will be chosen over q.
3. Transitivity (TRANS): p Â q and q Â r ⇒ p Â r
TRANS states that if a lottery p is chosen over lottery q, and q is chosen over
r, then p will be chosen over r.
4. Independence (IND): ∀λ p Â q ⇒λp+ (1−λ)r Âλq+ (1−λ)r
IND states that if p is chosen over q, then the mixture of p with any lottery r
will be chosen over the equivalent mixture of q with r.
5. Branch Independence (BRANCH): λp+ (1−λ)r Âλq+ (1−λ)r ⇒λp+ (1−λ)s Â
λq+ (1−λ)s
BRANCH states that if the mixture of p and r is chosen over the mixture of q
and r, then the preference will not change when r is swapped out for a different
lottery, s.
6. Consistency (CONS): p Â q ⇒ p Â q
CONS states that if p is chosen over q, then p always will be chosen over q.
In addition to these six main axioms, we included the “opposite” of each axiom (de-
noted as ¬axioms). The ¬axioms reverse the preference relation after the implication
for each of the six main axioms. We use the ¬axioms to test for understanding, con-
trol for potential demand effects, and disentangle explanations for selecting different
axioms.
Formally, we included the following six ¬axioms:
1. Not Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (¬IIA): p = C({p, q, r})⇒ q = C({p, q})
2. Not First Order Stochastic Dominance (¬FOSD): ∀x 1−P(x)≥ 1−Q(x) ⇒ q Â
p
3. Not Transitivity (¬TRANS): p Â q and q Â r ⇒ r Â p
4. Not Independence (¬IND):∀λ p Â q ⇒λq+ (1−λ)r Âλp+ (1−λ)r
5. Not Branch Independence (¬BRANCH): λp+ (1−λ)r Âλq+ (1−λ)r ⇒λq+ (1−
λ)s Âλp+ (1−λ)s
6. Not Consistency (¬CONS): p Â q ⇒ q Â p
We also designed six meaningless distractor rules, which were over unrelated lot-
teries. For example, one distractor rule is p Â q ⇒ r Â s where the lotteries p, q, r,
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and s are unrelated. This rule essentially implements a random choice. We used
the distractor rules only as a buffer so that subjects were less likely to notice the
relationships between the axioms and ¬axioms. The full list of the distractor rules is
in the Supplemental Appendix. When we refer to the axioms, ¬axioms, or distractor
rules as general choice objects, we refer to them as rules, which is the language used
in the experimental instructions.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment consisted of four separate blocks, presented to subjects in the order
described below. Within each block, we presented questions in a pre-defined random-
ized order.5 In Block 1, we directly elicited preferences over rules. In Block 2, we had
subjects choose a lottery from binary decision problems which, unbeknownst to them,
were related to the rules. In Block 3, we elicited subjects’ willingness to re-evaluate
any inconsistencies between their rule choices and lottery choices. In Block 4, we
provided reconciliation opportunities for almost all lottery choices that violated one
of the axioms or ¬axioms a subject selected in Block 1.6 In the following subsections,
we describe in detail the choices made in each block. Subjects were paid from exactly
one randomly selected decision which could have been from any of the four blocks.
We describe the choices and payment mechanisms in detail below. To overview the
payments, subjects could be paid for one of four possibilities: original rule choices
(Block 1), original lottery choices (Block 2), revised rule choices (Block 4), or revised
lottery choices (Block 4). The incentivization procedures are the same for original
and revised rules, and are the same for original and revised lotteries. Rules are
incentivized by applying them on a set of lotteries and paying subjects what the rule
prescribes selecting. If individuals do not want to follow a rule, instead they make the
lottery choices themselves. Original and revised lottery choices are incentivized in
the standard manner, by paying subjects a realization from the lottery they selected.7
The choice of which question would be paid is based on random chance as well as
5Due to complications in programming and incentivizing all of the questions and reconciled
choices, we were unable to randomize question order across subjects. Therefore, while we can en-
sure subjects did not see all FOSD questions in a row, for example, all subjects saw questions in the
same order.
6As we explain below, we did not have subjects reconcile one violation of ¬TRANS, given that it
was impossible for us to explain how to make a price-list completely intransitive.
7All payment uncertainty was resolved using physical randomization devices, in particular two
ten-sided dice.
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subjects’ decisions in Block 3. Subjects were paid at the very end of the experiment,
regardless of which decision was selected for payment.
III.A. Block 1: Rule Choices
The objective in Block 1 was to elicit whether subjects want their choices to sat-
isfy canonical choice axioms. The first challenge lies in making the rules accessible
and easy for subjects to understand, while still retaining their broad implications on
choices. To address this, the rules for making choices were presented as a form of
logic statements. We represented the choice objects in an abstract manner, denoting
lotteries by colored circles (see Figure I). Subjects were told that the colored circles
represent monetary lotteries but they did not know the exact lotteries associated
with each rule. We inform subjects that the lotteries could have payoffs from $0–$30,
with any probabilities from 0%–100%.
The second challenge is incentivizing the rule choice so that subjects select all of
the rules they view as desirable and do not select any others. We did this by asking
subjects to decide whether they prefer the rule to make choices for them or whether
they would rather make the relevant choices themselves.8 If the subject chose a
rule to make their decisions and it was selected as the payoff-relevant decision, then
we applied it to a set of lotteries where the rule has implications and the subject
was paid a realization of the lottery prescribed by the rule. Since the rules often
require choices as inputs, the subject would answer any relevant “input” questions,
and the program would select a lottery as an “output” based on the rule. If the subject
instead chose to make the choice themselves, then they would answer both the input
and output questions themselves. For any rules not chosen for payment, the subject
would never see the input or output lottery choices.
We give a detailed example to help understand the choices in Block 1. Figure I
shows how we represent IIA to the subjects.9 The rule reads as follows: “From the
options of black, grey, and white, you chose black. Therefore, from the options of black
and grey, we would select black for you.”10 We also included a written description of
8Subjects were not allowed to choose between these two options until at least 30 seconds had
passed. This design feature encourages subjects to consider the rules carefully before deciding.
9In the experiment, we used colors—red, orange, green, and blue—rather than black and white
alternatives. Colorblind subjects had the opportunity to take the show-up payment instead of partici-
pating, but we did not have any subjects take this option.
10For ¬IIA, the implication instead would be “Therefore, from the options of black and grey, we
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the rule on the subjects’ screens under the abstract depiction.11
If this rule were chosen for payment and the subject chose the rule to make their
decisions, then we would pay them according to the following procedure. First, there
is a bank of three lotteries corresponding to “black,” “grey,” and “white.” Subjects
knew that these could be any possible lotteries with payments from $0–$30, but
only saw the specific lotteries in the event this rule was chosen for payment. The
subject would choose their most preferred of the three. This represents the “black”
lottery. Following this choice, we would select “black” over “grey” and pay them the
realization of the “black” lottery. If they did not select the rule to make their choice,
they first would choose their most preferred of the three lotteries “black,” “grey,” and
“white.” Following this, we presented them with a decision between the lottery they
chose (“black”) versus one of the other two lotteries (“grey”). Here the subject would
have been paid the realization of the lottery they chose in this second decision.12
In the Supplemental Appendix, we show how we represent the other five axioms in
rule format. Combining the axioms, ¬axioms, and distractor rules, subjects made
eighteen decisions in Block 1.
Options: You Chose: We Choose:
vs. vs.
vs.
Figure I: Rule representation of IIA
Notes: We represent axioms in this manner. Colored circles represent any possible lotteries with
payoffs from $0–$30. Subjects choose whether to have this rule make choices for them or instead
make choices on their own.
We incentivized the rules this way to encourage subjects to select exactly the ax-
would select grey for you.”
11We described the rule using fruits which match the colored circles. For example, we say “If you
choose a blueberry over an apple and a grape, then we would choose a blueberry over an apple for
you.” Subjects are reminded, though, that the circles represent money and not consumption goods,
and there are no complementarities or tastes involved in mixtures.
12During payment, subjects were not told which rule was being implemented before they made
the input choices. If we had told them which rule was being implemented, they could answer the
input questions “opposite” their true preferences for the ¬axioms and still receive their truly-preferred
alternative.
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ioms which always should be true on the relevant domain of lotteries. Thus, subjects
should select the rules that they want to describe all of their choices, regardless of
the specific lotteries and payments. However, a worry is that subjects might be in-
different between selecting a rule and making the choice on their own. A subject
who does select a rule reveals that they want to make decisions according to the rule,
since it can be applied over any lotteries. The interpretation is less clear for subjects
who do not select a rule. A subject who agrees with a rule but believes their choices
will align with the rule anyway has no strict incentive to select the rule, aside from
the time and effort cost of making choices. In Appendix Section B, we present re-
sults from another treatment where subjects had to pay a small cost, $1, to make the
choice on their own. This makes it strictly costly not to select a rule, eliminating this
concern.13 We find that the rules are selected slightly more often in this treatment,
responding to the incentives, but all qualitative results remain unchanged. This in-
dicates that the vast majority of subjects who do not choose a rule aren’t doing so out
of indifference, but rather because they do not find it desirable.
III.B. Block 2: Lottery Choices
Given that our main interest is in studying how individuals reconcile inconsistent
choices, we selected lottery questions from previous papers which found violations
of the axioms. We do not focus on the specifics of the lotteries here, but we picked
questions to maximize axiom violations. Our intention is not to compare violations
across axioms since the questions are not representative of the axiom more generally.
A description of references and violations for each question can be found in Table I,
along with the question numbering that we use to present the results. The full set of
questions can be found in Appendix C.
The payment amounts span from $0 to $30, and lotteries range in expected value
from $1.40 to $26. Within each question (with either two or three lotteries), the dif-
ference in expected value between the lotteries ranges from $0 to $6. On average, the
expected value difference is just shy of $1.75. Furthermore, these lottery questions
are not the same as the lottery questions that incentivized Block 1 rule choices. This
13Here, however, the interpretation is less clear for subjects who do select a rule. A subject who
selects a rule does not necessarily indicate they always want to follow the rule. It could be that they
want to follow the rule “most” of the time, so in expectation, they believe it is not worth paying $1 to
make choices on their own.
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Question Reference
IIA1–IIA3 Huber et al. (1982) (Attraction Affect)
IIA4 Huber et al. (1982) (Compromise Effect)
FOSD1–FOSD4 Birnbaum and Martin (2003)
TRANS1–TRANS2 Loomes et al. (1991) (Regret Theory)
TRANS3 Brown and Healy (2018) (Multiple Switch Points)
IND1 Birnbaum and Chavez (1997)
IND2 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) (Certainty Effect)
IND3 Jain and Nielsen (2019) (Reverse Certainty Effect)
BRANCH1 Birnbaum and Chavez (1997)
CONS1–CONS2 Brown and Healy (2018) (Near Indifference)
Table I: Description of Questions
was to ensure that subjects do not update on the type of lotteries where the rules
would apply. We briefly describe the source of the questions.
INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES — We used four IIA questions
similar to Huber et al. (1982). Three of the four questions targeted violations of IIA
by adding a dominated lottery to a binary choice problem to “attract” the subject to
the dominating alternative. We refer to these as IIA1, IIA2, and IIA3. The fourth
question, IIA4, targeted a violation of IIA by adding a lottery to a binary choice
problem that makes one of the initial two lotteries a “compromise” option.
TRANSITIVITY — We used two transitivity questions (TRANS1 and TRANS2) sim-
ilar to Loomes et al. (1991) that were used to examine regret theory. In addition,
we included six binary questions which together comprised a separated price list,
as demonstrated in Brown and Healy (2018).14 These six questions involved binary
comparisons between a risky lottery and a sure payment. The risky lottery was the
same in all six questions while the sure payment varied. Multiple switch points on
the price list constitute a violation of transitivity, which we refer to as TRANS3.
FIRST-ORDER STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE — We asked four binary questions to tar-
get violations of FOSD (FOSD1–FOSD4). All four questions followed the structure
in Birnbaum and Martin (2003).
INDEPENDENCE — We included three questions that targeted violations of inde-
pendence, including one question from Birnbaum and Chavez (1997) (IND1), one
14For example, one question was a binary choice between lottery p and $14.00. Another was the
choice between p and $14.50, another between p and $15.00, etc. Presenting questions of this form is
a common procedure used to elicit a certainty equivalent for lottery p.
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question from (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) demonstrating the certainty effect
(IND2), and one question from Jain and Nielsen (2019) demonstrating the reverse
certainty effect (IND3).
BRANCH INDEPENDENCE — We included one question targeting a violation of
Branch Independence from Birnbaum and Chavez (1997) (BRANCH1).
CONSISTENCY — We included two questions to target violations of consistency in
which we asked two binary decision problems that were each repeated twice (CONS1
and CONS2).15 We chose the binary decision problems based on the questions that
were nearest to indifference in Brown and Healy (2018).
We displayed the lotteries simply by reporting the probabilities and payoffs of each
possible outcome. Subjects saw the lotteries on their screens as below and made
their choices by selecting the rectangular button corresponding to their preferred
option. Altogether, subjects make choices from thirty-three binary or trinary decision
problems in Block 2.
Option A Option B
Option A:
50% chance of $3
50% chance of $15
Option B:
25% chance of $5
75% chance of $12
Figure II: Representation of lotteries
We chose to standardize the presentation of the lotteries to ease subjects’ under-
standing and to allow for clean comparisons across axioms. The drawback, however,
is that our results are not directly comparable to the original papers due to differ-
ences in framing. For example, Loomes et al. (1991) presented lotteries in a table
format that displayed probabilities as the length of a given cell. It is possible that
these different presentation formats invoke different behavioral responses, so our
experiment does not directly replicate previous papers.16
One issue when studying preferences over axioms is that if an individual views
15The questions are not repeated back to back.
16Indeed, we find fewer violations of transitivity than Loomes et al. (1991). The most likely expla-
nation is that their presentation of the decision problem induced stronger feelings of regret, leading
to more violations.
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many axioms as normative, the axioms combined may have unexpected implica-
tions across questions. For example, continuity, completeness, transitivity, and inde-
pendence together imply that there is an expected utility representation consistent
across all questions. To ameliorate this concern, we chose lotteries so that the ques-
tions have no implications across multiple axioms. In particular, we did not use any
of the same lotteries to target more than one axiom. The lotteries used in FOSD1,
for example, are completely distinct from lotteries used in any other question. There-
fore, there are no immediate implications of the axioms across questions, and each
decision applies only to its targeted axiom.
We make no assumptions on preferences except for dominance in degenerate lot-
teries, i.e. δx Â δy if and only if x > y.17 In using the random problem selection
payment mechanism, we also assume a form of monotonicity in the space of two-
stage lotteries (Azrieli et al., 2019). Brown and Healy (2018) give evidence that this
condition is met in a risky choice experiment similar to ours.
III.C. Block 3: Willingness to Reconcile
To elicit willingness to reconcile inconsistent choices, we had subjects rank any of
the six main axioms they selected against a $1 outside option. For example, a subject
who selected all six axioms would see seven boxes on their screen—one for each of
the axioms, and one with an option that says “I would rather have $1 than reconcile
choices associated with any of the remaining rules.” Subjects first select the axiom
they would most want to reconcile should their choices violate it, or select the outside
option if they would rather have $1 than reconcile their choices. Then, subjects select
the axiom they would next-most want to reconcile among the remaining axioms, and
so on.
If the ranking were chosen for payment, we would randomly select two of the avail-
able axioms or the outside option and pay the subject according to the Block 4 recon-
ciled choices from whichever axiom they ranked higher. For example, take a subject
who ranks the axioms in the order FOSD Â IIA Â TRANS Â CONS Â Outside Option
Â BRANCH Â IND. We would randomly select two options, say IIA and the Outside
Option. The subject ranked IIA higher, so they would be paid based on their recon-
17This assumption allows us to represent multiple switches on a price list as a violation of transi-
tivity. It is also relevant for FOSD violations.
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ciled choices in the IIA question, as described below.18 Regardless of their ranking,
a subject still faces all of the reconciliation decisions in Block 4; the ranking only
impacts which would be paid.
Technically, the reconciled choices for the last-ranked axiom would not be incen-
tivized in this procedure. The reconciled choices of last-ranked axiom would never
be implemented since we implement the reconciled choices of whichever axiom is
ranked higher. To ensure incentive compatibility, there’s an independent chance that
we would randomly select the reconciled choices to pay, as described below. This
means that the reconciled choices are almost twice as likely to be paid as the orig-
inal choices. Therefore, if anything, subjects should be more concerned with their
reconciled choices than their original choices. This also helps encourage subjects to
carefully consider the reconciliation opportunity.
The main purpose of the ranking is to see whether subjects strictly prefer to re-
evaluate their choices. This gives us only a coarse measure—whether individuals are
willing to give up at least $1. We felt this would be easier for subjects to understand
than trying to elicit a finer willingness-to-pay for each axiom. We also use the re-
ported rankings to look for any consistent patterns within rankings.19 This gives us
a finer measure of subjects’ perceptions of the rules compared to the binary ranking
in Block 1.20
III.D. Block 4: Reconciliation
After subjects ranked all of the axioms, we presented them with every inconsistency
between their lottery choices and selected axioms or ¬axioms. For example, a subject
who selected IIA in Block 1 but violated IIA with their lottery choices in Block 2 saw
these choices side by side on their screen. We color-highlighted the original choices
that the subject made. We color-coded the choices to match the colors in the rule
so the subject could better understand how the rule mapped onto their choices. We
18If they had ranked the outside option higher, they would be paid for their original choices in the
IIA question and would receive an extra $1 bonus. If they did not violate IIA, they would be paid for
their original choices and would receive a $1 bonus, which ensures their ranking is not affected by
their perceptions of which axioms they were more likely to have violated.
19With this procedure, we cannot rule out that subjects are indifferent among the axioms or to the
outside option. We look for systematic patterns in the rankings, but acknowledge this as a shortcoming
of our ranking procedure. We also cannot rule out that rankings are driven by subjects’ beliefs about
the expected value differences of the associated lotteries.
20Eliciting a ranking over axioms is also similar to the work of MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979).
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also included a color-coded explanation of why choices violated the rule and how they
could be reconciled. We provide a screenshot in the Appendix A and reproduce an
example below in Figure III.
Options: You Chose: We Choose:
vs. vs.
vs.
Black:
80% chance of $0
20% chance of $10
Grey:
60% chance of $0
40% chance of $6
White:
80% chance of $0
20% chance of $7
Black:
80% chance of $0
20% chance of $10
Grey:
60% chance of $0
40% chance of $6
Figure III: Example of Reconciliation Screen
Notes: The options highlighted in grey indicate subjects’ original choices in Blocks 1 and 2. For
example, this subject selected IIA in Block 1, but chose “black over grey and white” in one question
and chose “grey over black” in another question. Below this, subjects saw an explanation of why the
rule would have selected something different than what they chose for themselves.
Subjects could change any of their choices, or could leave them as they were. We
impressed upon subjects that they could change any of their lottery choices to match
the rule, could unselect the rule, or could leave choices inconsistent. As a result, there
was no default direction for any potential experimenter demand effect. Consistency
in choices could arise equally by unselecting rules or by changing lottery choices.
When a reconciled choice was selected for payment, we paid subjects for the rule or
lottery in the same manner as the original choices were paid in Blocks 1 and 2. That
is, if a reconciled rule were chosen for payment and the subject kept the rule selected,
then we would apply this rule on a set of lottery questions.21 If instead the subject
unselected the rule during the reconciliation opportunity, then they would make the
lottery choice themselves. If reconciled lottery choices were selected for payment,
then the individual would be paid the lottery ultimately chosen in the reconciliation
stage. Furthermore, choices which were not violating a rule also could be paid again
as reconciliation choices to maintain equal probability of all rules and lotteries being
paid. In this case, we paid the subject based on their original rule or lottery choice.
21We did not specify one way or another to subjects, but this set of lottery questions was different
from the set of lottery questions incentivizing Block 1 rule choices.
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Subjects reconciled choices inconsistent with each of the six axioms and the six
¬axioms.22 Subjects reconciled each violation independently. That is, a subject who
selected IIA and violated it on two separate occasions had two separate opportunities
to reconcile the violations, rather than reconciling all choices together.23 We did
this to encourage subjects to analyze each choice in isolation. This allows us to see
whether some types of violations are reconciled in favor of rules while others are
reconciled in favor of lotteries. We also had subjects reconcile inconsistencies within
their rule choices. For example, a subject who chose both IIA and ¬IIA in Block 1
would also see these rules side by side on their screen and choose which, if any, to
keep selected. These decisions were incentivized in the same way as other revised
rules.
The number of reconciliation opportunities varied per subject, based on number of
violations and on number of axioms and ¬axioms selected. On average, subjects had
5.5 reconciliation opportunities. The number of the reconciliations ranged from zero
to twenty-two.
We analyze data from 110 subjects, primarily undergraduate students at the Ohio
State University where the sessions took place. We programmed the experiment us-
ing z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and recruited subjects using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
Sessions lasted about one hour, and subjects earned $15 on average, including a $7
show-up payment. Instructions are included in a Supplemental Appendix.
IV. RESULTS
Figure IV shows the percentage of subjects who selected each axiom in Block 1.
We break this down by whether a subject selected the axiom only, the axiom and
the ¬axiom, only the ¬axiom, or neither. FOSD is most popular, selected by 90%
of subjects overall. For the remaining axioms, 85% select Consistency, 83% select
Transitivity, 83% select IIA, and 83% select Independence, and 82% select Branch
Independence. The axioms are much more often selected than the ¬axioms. In
22We did not have subjects reconcile ¬TRANS with the price list, as we could not explain how
to make the price list completely intransitive. We did not have subjects reconcile the meaningless
distractor rules given that there is no natural way to present the violating choices.
23This also means that the reconciliation was not dynamic. That is, a subject who selected both
IIA and ¬IIA in Block 1, and then violated IIA in Block 2, may have reconciled these choices to be
consistent with IIA. In doing so, this might lead them to be inconsistent with ¬IIA! We did not present
them this subsequent reconciliation. The reconciliation opportunities were fixed and determined by
their choices in Blocks 1 and 2.
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particular, 15% selected ¬Branch Independence, 14% selected ¬Independence, 12%
selected ¬IIA, 11% selected ¬Transitivity, 10% selected ¬FOSD, and 5% selected
¬Consistency.
Figure IV: Percentage of Subjects Selecting Each Rule in Block 1
Interestingly, FOSD is the most popular axiom while ¬FOSD is among the least
popular ¬axioms. Similarly, Branch Independence is the least popular axiom while
¬Branch Independence is the most popular ¬axiom. This might indicate that there
are some patterns to how subjects perceive the axioms. FOSD is most “obviously”
desirable, and therefore ¬FOSD is obviously not desirable. The opposite is true for
Branch Independence. This suggests some features of axioms might be more or less
compelling to individuals. It is also interesting that both FOSD and Branch Inde-
pendence involve “mixing,” so it is not that case that individuals are just averse to, or
confused by, mixing. From our data, however, we cannot say whether this is driven
by differences in understanding of the axioms or differences in preferences over the
axioms.
Table IX in the Appendix shows the number of axioms and ¬axioms selected on an
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individual level. 60% of subjects selected all six axioms, and 65% of subjects never
selected a ¬axiom. Among individuals who ever select a ¬axiom, it is most common
for individuals to select only one of them. Therefore, we have confidence that sub-
jects understand the decision rules and incentivization procedure. In the Appendix,
we report correlations of selecting the various axioms. All pairwise correlations are
significantly positive, and we do not detect any obvious patterns.
Overall, we conclude that individuals do view these axioms as desirable methods
for choosing lotteries since they are chosen at much higher rates than the ¬axioms.
While these same individuals will go on to violate the axioms in their choices, they
express a preference for their choices to satisfy these axioms as a general principle.
Result 1. Nearly all individuals reveal a preference for their choices to satisfy canon-
ical choice axioms. These axioms are selected at much higher rates (≈ 85%) than their
negations (≈ 10%).
Figure V: Percentage of Subjects Revising Choices in Block 4, Conditional on Select-
ing Axiom
Given that subjects prefer to satisfy these axioms, the question remains as to how
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individuals respond when their choices do not. Among those who select the respec-
tive axiom, 85% of subjects violated FOSD, 75% violated Independence, 46% violated
Consistency, 43% violated transitivity, 38% violated IIA, and 24% violated Branch
Independence. Over 85% of subjects who violated an axiom indicated in Block 1 that
they wanted to follow the axiom, so “wanting” to follow a rule does not ensure that a
subject can or will follow the rule. Our main focus is whether these subjects reconcile
their choices in Block 4 and whether they reconcile by changing their lottery choices
or by abandoning the decision rule.
Figure V shows choices in the reconciliation block (Block 4), broken down by ques-
tion. A non-trivial percentage of inconsistencies are not reconciled, which we discuss
below. Of those who do change their choices, it is far more common for individuals to
change their lottery choices to be consistent with the axiom than to unselect the ax-
iom. Across all questions, 79% of revisions are in favor of the axioms, rather than the
opposite. Naturally, this is significantly different from a 50–50 split in the direction
of revisions (p = 0.0000).
Table II breaks this down by axiom. In column two, we report the percentage of
individuals who changed any of their choices in the reconciliation. In columns three
and four, we report the conditional percentages of revising the lottery versus revising
the axiom, excluding those who revise both.24
Conditional Conditional
Axiom % Revised Either % Revise Lottery % Revise axiom
Any (n=782) 63% 79% 21%
IIA (n=116) 76% 99% 1%
FOSD (n=359) 44% 66% 34%
TRANS (n=46) 80% 94% 6%
IND (n=159) 50% 78% 22%
BRANCH (n=22) 59% 100% 0%
CONS (n=80) 91% 100% 0%
Table II: Percentage of Violations Revised and Direction of Reconciliation
Notes: The second column gives the percentage of violations that were reconciled. The third column
reports the percentage of these reconciliations where subjects revised their lottery choices, and the
last column reports the percentage of these reconciliations where subjects revised their rule choices.
24Note, the sample sizes vary widely as individuals violated some axioms more than others, and
some axioms had more questions than others. For example, there were four FOSD questions, and 85%
of subjects violated FOSD at least once. On the other hand, there was only one Branch Independence
question and 24% of subjects violated the axiom.
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Figure VI: Percentage of Subjects Revising Choices in Block 4, Conditional on Se-
lecting Opposite Axiom
We use the reconciliation of the ¬axioms as a benchmark for the direction of recon-
ciliation. We might worry that individuals change their choices to match the rules as
a form of experimenter demand effect. We tried to eliminate this in the design—since
subjects could make their choices consistent either by changing their lottery choices
or by un-selecting the rule, there is no obvious direction for the demand effect. How-
ever, the description of the rule violation informed subjects of how they could make
their lottery choices consistent with the rule, so changes in lottery choices could re-
flect subjects simply “following instructions” rather than a real desire to choose con-
sistently with the axiom. We will see that this is not the case, as individuals are less
likely to reconcile their choices in favor of the ¬axioms.
Figure VI shows the same breakdown of revised choices conditional on subjects
selecting the ¬axioms. Across all questions, 44% of revisions are in favor of the
¬axioms, not significantly different from a 50–50 split (p = 0.311). This is in signif-
icant contrast to the 79% of instances where subjects reconcile in favor of the main
axioms (Wilcoxon Ranksum p = 0.0000).
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Figure VII: Percentage of Subjects Revising Choices in Block 4, Conditional on Se-
lecting axiom and ¬axiom
One might still worry, however, that individuals who select the ¬axioms are sys-
tematically different from those who select the axioms. For instance, they might not
understand the rule representations or payment incentives. Differences in reconcili-
ation patterns could be driven by these factors, but we have no reason to believe this
type of noise would be systematic. We can rule this out further by looking at indi-
viduals who select both an axiom and corresponding ¬axiom. Conducting the same
analysis as above, restricted to this subsample, we find the results unchanged. When
reconciling violations of the axioms, individuals revise their choices 69% of the time,
and 65% of revisions follow the axiom. When reconciling violations of the ¬axioms,
these individuals revise their choices 72% of the time, and only 36% of revisions fol-
low the ¬axiom, which is significantly lower than for the main axioms (p = 0.0149).
Furthermore, Figure VII shows the rule reconciliation pattern for these individu-
als. That is, we look to see how individuals reconcile their rule choices when faced
with both the axiom and ¬axiom. Within that sample, we find individuals still fa-
vor the main axioms. Among individuals who un-select one of the rules, over 89%
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of them un-select the ¬axiom. That is, when individuals are faced with two decision
rules that prescribe opposite choices, they realize this and abandon the less-sensible
rule.
We conclude that a majority individuals who wanted to follow the axioms but vi-
olated them made a mistake in their lottery choices. There is a baseline tendency
to keep choices inconsistent (as we will discuss below, in Result 4). However, among
reconciliations, the axioms are usually followed.
Result 2. Individuals violating canonical axioms often change their choices to be
consistent with the axiom (≈ 79% of revisions). Individuals violating ¬axioms are
much less likely to do so (≈ 44% of revisions).
Finally, we look at how subjects ranked the axioms in Block 3. We find that, for
each of the six axioms, about 60% of subjects are willing to give up at least $1 to
re-evaluate their inconsistent choices. We find that 66% of subjects rank Branch
Independence before the $1 outside option, and this is similar at 62% for Indepen-
dence, 62% for FOSD, 62% for IIA, 60% for Transitivity, and 56% for Consistency.
The pairwise comparison between Consistency and Branch Independence is signifi-
cant (p = 0.041) but all other pairwise comparisons show insignificant differences in
willingness to pay (Wilcoxon Sign Rank tests, p > 0.134). On an individual level, 85%
of subjects are willing to give up $1 to re-evaluate choices corresponding to at least
one axiom.
Looking at the average ranking of each axiom, again we find very few differences.
Figure VIII presents the average ranking for each of the alternatives. Transitivity
and Independence are ranked lowest (most preferred), while the outside option is the
least preferred, on average. There are some significant differences across axioms,
but all axioms are preferred to the outside option on average. Therefore, it seems
that subjects do not have any systematic preferences among the axioms they wish
the follow.
Result 3. A majority of subjects (≈ 85%) are willing to pay for the opportunity to
reconcile their choices when choices conflict with an axiom they want to follow.
Finally, Figures V, VII, and VI show that about 30% of subjects keep their choices
inconsistent across these revision opportunities. Inconsistencies with the axioms are
revised 63% of the time and inconsistencies with the ¬axioms are reconciled 67% of
22
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Figure VIII: Average Ranking of Each Axiom
Notes: Lower ranking corresponds to the rule being more preferred.
the time (p = 0.37). This is true even among individuals who have a strict preference
for re-evaluating their decisions. While this might seem odd at first blush, there are a
few reasons why individuals might keep their choices inconsistent. The most obvious
to us is simple effort cost. Subjects have already thought about these decisions and
chosen what they prefer. Revising choices is costly in terms of time and cognitive
effort, and individuals may view the cost as too high.
Again, we view this as a baseline in our experimental design. Across the axioms,
¬axioms, and rule reconciliations, there is a latent minority of choices which go un-
reconciled. This could result from a number of factors, and our experiment is not
designed to disentangle these, but we see clear patterns among those who do recon-
cile their choices. It would be interesting for future research to better understand
more about the choices kept inconsistent.
Result 4. Individuals keep their choices inconsistent in about one third of all recon-
ciliation opportunities.
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While we could look at comparative statics of the reconciliations, for example
whether revised choices become more or less risk averse, our experiment is not de-
signed for these questions. We chose the lottery questions in order to maximize vi-
olations of the axioms, and therefore the questions are in no sense representative
of the violations and revisions we might see more generally. However, we believe
our methodology could be very useful in answering these types of questions in fu-
ture research. As a step in this direction, see Benjamin et al. (2019) who study risky
investment decisions before and after reconciliation opportunities.
V. LITERATURE REVIEW
Naturally, our paper relates directly to the large literature on violations of decision
theory axioms. Many papers, in addition to those cited in Section III, have found
violations of the axioms we study. We confirm these violations, but our experiment
allows us to identify a majority of these violations as mistakes. Individuals do want
their choices to satisfy these axioms, and, when given the opportunity for reflection
and revision, individuals often prefer to change their choices to be consistent with
the axiom.
We are not aware of any papers that incentive-compatibly elicit the axioms an in-
dividual wants to follow. Even without incentives, we are not aware of any papers
that elicit axioms and allow for reconciliation with violating choices, which is neces-
sary to detect whether an individual made a mistake. There are three related papers
in economics which come closest to our motivation: MacCrimmon (1968), Slovic and
Tversky (1974), and MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979). Since our work builds off
these pioneering studies, we describe them in detail.
MacCrimmon (1968) asked questions to thirty-eight business executives designed
to induce potential violations of five postulates of decision theory. After making de-
cisions, the postulates of choice were discussed with the executives and the execu-
tives were allowed to change their choices during the discussion. Within the experi-
ment, most executives were either consistent with the postulates of decision theory
or changed their choices in favor of the postulates after some discussion, consistent
with our results. While an ambitious study, the unstructured nature of the discus-
sion, lack of incentives, and specialized subject pool are limitations to external va-
lidity of the results. Furthermore, the postulates were presented to subjects by the
24
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3481381
experimenter in the reconciliation opportunity. A main contribution of our experi-
ment is that subjects themselves choose both the axioms and the lotteries, so the
reconciliation is less prone to experimenter demand effects and other outside moti-
vations.
In a related study, Slovic and Tversky (1974) ask unincentivized lottery questions
related to the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes to undergraduate students. After mak-
ing their decisions, subjects were presented with “advice” in the form of explained
arguments for and against the independence axiom and the sure thing principle.
Subjects were told that the arguments came from prominent decision theorists. Af-
ter reading the arguments, subjects were asked to reconsider their original lottery
choices. Overall, they find few subjects changing their decisions to be consistent with
the advice. In addition to being incentivized, a contribution of our design is to elicit
individuals’ preferences over these axioms, rather than presenting them as advice
or arguments from others. This allows individuals to see the inconsistencies within
their own preferences, rather than deciding whether to follow the logic from an out-
sider. This could be one explanation for why our subjects are more likely to revise
their choices compared to Slovic and Tversky’s.
MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979) asked graduate students to indicate their level
of agreement with 20 decision rules related to the axioms of expected utility theory.
Additionally, they had subjects make unincentivized lottery choices and indicate any
decision procedures involved in making the choices. They find that individuals view
the decision rules favorably but often violate them. In this experiment, there is no
reconciliation stage. We design our experiment to carefully incentivize these choices
and to study how individuals reconcile discrepancies between their choice of lotteries
and decision rules.
A number of contemporaneous papers study reconciled choices from disparate mo-
tivations. Benjamin et al. (2019) develop a survey procedure to reduce framing effects
when measuring risk aversion, in order to get better risk measurements to inform
retirement saving policies. They have subjects make hypothetical life-cycle savings
choices which are related to one another according to various consistency principles.
They ask subjects to reconsider their conflicting choices and rate whether the sit-
uations are sufficiently different to warrant choosing different options. Breig and
Feldman (2019) ask subjects a number of risky budget set decisions, each repeated
twice. Subjects are given the opportunity to revise their choices with both choices
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shown on the screen. Individuals often revise, and revised choices are slightly closer
to rationality according to standard revealed preference measures. In this study, the
decisions are most closely related to our Consistency axiom. Crosetto and Gaudeul
(2019) study the asymmetric dominance effect and find that the effect disappears
after subjects are given time and incentives to revise their choices.
Though very different environments, our paper is also related to the literature
studying strategies in repeated games. Romero and Rosokha (2018), Cason and
Mui (2019), and Dal Bó and Fréchette (2019), among others, allow subjects to de-
sign comprehensive strategies in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games,
rather than choosing actions each period. While our subjects do not design their
own “axioms” to follow, our paper can be thought of as a similar procedural experi-
ment where subjects choose rules to implement decisions for them. This is similar to
the distinction between substantive and procedural rationality as outlined in Simon
(1976), who calls for economists to “become interested in the procedures—the ra-
tional processes—that economic actors use to cope with uncertainty” (Simon, 1976,
p.81). Halevy and Mayraz (2020) take a step in that direction, allowing subjects to
design procedures to carry out their investment decisions. They find that subjects
prefer using procedures to making decisions on their own, which is similar to our
subjects’ preference for following the axioms.
VI. DISCUSSION
We present the first incentivized experimental evidence supporting the view that
canonical choice axioms have normative content and that violations of axioms repre-
sent mistakes. In directly eliciting preferences over axioms, we find that individuals
view them as rules that they want their choices to follow. When lottery choices con-
flict with stated axiom preferences, individuals change their choices to be consistent
with the axiom, rather than inferring from their choices that the axiom is not desir-
able.
Our experiment takes a step towards identifying individuals’ choices as “prefer-
ences” versus “mistakes,” but also highlights the difficulties in doing so. The evidence
suggests that most subjects do view these axioms as desirable and change choices
accordingly, leading us to interpret their inconsistent lottery choices as mistakes.
However, a substantial minority of individuals do not change their choices despite
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wanting to follow the axiom. In this case, it is not obvious how to declare either the
axiom or lottery decisions as preferences or mistakes in these cases. However, these
situations might not be surprising. For example, Gilboa et al. (2009) argue that it is
natural to encounter situations where a preference for a decision rule conflicts with
preferences over a single decision problem. Sometimes individuals resolve a conflict
by adhering to the rule (axiom) and other times by adhering to their decisions, but
neither needs to be abandoned in general. Subjects in our experiment who conflict in
their rules and choices demonstrate that these cases occur in practice.
This experiment also demonstrates the difficulty of making welfare statements
from choices. For example, whether or not a subject reconciles an inconsistency of-
ten depends on the question that is asked. One case of this occurs for the three
questions related to independence. For question IND1, subjects are more likely to
revise their choices to satisfy independence than IND2 or IND3. Thus, using inde-
pendence to evaluate welfare may depend on the type of question asked. Other issues
of measuring welfare are brought up in Bernheim and Rangel (2009) and focus on the
difficulty of making welfare statements in the presence of framing. In contrast, all of
our questions are framed the same way so we demonstrate issues of making welfare
statements even holding the framing of questions fixed.
We believe our results provide implications for both theoretical models and exper-
imental design, and we discuss these both in turn. We also see a number of open
directions for future research, and we outline these explicitly.
VI.A. Implications for Theory
Our results suggest a role for economic theory to model preferences over axioms
alongside modeling the choices individuals make. Our experiment elicits two re-
vealed preferences—one over axioms and one over lotteries. These preference re-
lations do not always align, resulting in violations of the axioms. However, results
suggest that, in these cases, the preference over axioms supersedes the lottery prefer-
ence. Our results suggest that individuals do have preferences over axioms directly,
so it might prove fruitful to incorporate these preferences into theoretical models.
This would provide structure to exploring the interaction between axiom preferences
and choices. While there is little theoretical work that explicitly models different
types preferences that are related, one example is Gilboa et al. (2010) which models
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the relation between objective and subjective preferences.
Our results also contribute to an interesting discussion on the role of decision the-
ory, outlined in Gilboa (2010), who writes:
“We are equipped with the phenomenally elegant classical decision the-
ory and faced with the outpour of experimental evidence á la Kahneman
and Tversky, showing that each and every axiom fails in carefully de-
signed laboratory experiments. What should we do in face of these viola-
tions? One approach is to incorporate them into our descriptive theories,
to make the latter more accurate. This is, to a large extent, the road
taken by behavioral economics. Another approach is to go out and preach
our classical theories, that is, to use them as normative ones... In other
words, we can either bring the theory closer to reality (making the theory
a better descriptive one) or bring reality closer to the theory (preaching
the theory as a normative one). Which should we choose?”
Our results call for the latter, and suggest that individuals already view the classi-
cal theory as normative in many instances. For a majority of individuals, violating
canonical axioms is revealed irrational by their own choices. We help individuals
make better decisions, according to their own preferences, when we assist them in
satisfying these axioms. This is not to diminish the role of descriptive theories, but
to draw attention to the different roles that descriptive and normative theories may
play.
VI.B. Implications for Experiments
Given that we find individuals making mistakes, it’s unclear how elicited preferences
would change after individuals are given the opportunity to “correct” their choices.
For example, are revised choices systematically more/less risk averse than original
choices? As mentioned above, we chose specific questions that would result in viola-
tions of the axioms, so our experiment was not designed to answer these questions.
However, we can speculate on the implications. For example, one of our questions
(TRANS3) comprised a separated price list. Price lists are common tools for exper-
imental elicitation, and there is no general consensus as to whether experimenters
should enforce a single switching point (see discussion in Brown and Healy (2018)).
We find that over 70% of subjects who exhibit intransitivites in the form of multiple
switching points change their choices to be transitive. This suggests that enforcing
a single switching point might actually help subjects express their underlying desire
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for transitivity.
In this vein, it might be the case that there are other features of the environ-
ment or experimental design that cause axiom preferences and choice preferences to
align. For example, experimental interfaces could notify subjects when they violate
consistency or independence of irrelevant alternatives. If we want to elicit subjects’
“rational” preferences, or the choices that they do not regret, this might require more
study into the structure and design of experiments.
More generally, our results suggest caution in designing and interpreting exper-
imental tests of axioms. While it is possible to design choices to induce violations
of nearly any axiom, researchers (ourselves included) should think carefully about
whether these violations are revealing meaningful preferences or whether we are
simply setting “traps” for subjects to fall into. If we “trick” subjects into making
choices they regret, this might not be the kind of evidence we want to use to design
economic models.
VI.C. Directions for Future Research
We view our experiment as one in a new line of experiments in procedural choice. We
see many interesting directions in which to take this agenda, and we outline a few
below.
In our experiment, people tend to follow “rules” over following choices. It would
be interesting to understand more about when and where this is true. It is also
interesting to what aspects of the environment (e.g. framing) alters an individual’s
perceptions of decision rules. In a somewhat-related study, Oprea (2019) analyzes
aspects of the decision environment that make rules more complex to implement.
It would be interesting to understand more about how these measures of complexity
interact with the questions we answer in our paper. For example, what features make
axioms more complex to understand? Are more complex axioms less appealing? Does
the complexity of the environment (here, relatively simple lottery choices) affect the
rules one wishes to implement in that environment? More generally, we believe it
fruitful to study when and why it is difficult for people to implement the principles
they feel should guide their choices.
As we referenced in the Introduction, there are many other environments in which
our methodology could prove useful. For example, researchers often have hypotheses
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about competing heuristics, and could use our methodology to elicit the desirability
of these heuristics directly. In short, we could elicit what individuals “want to be” or
think they “should be” doing, in addition (or instead of) eliciting what they actually
do. Naturally these methodologies are complementary, and we believe this to be a
fruitful avenue for future research.
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A. SCREENSHOTS
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Figure IX: Axiom Selection Rates Across Treatments
B. STRICT COST OF DECIDING
As we described in Section III, we ran an additional treatment where subjects had to
pay a strictly positive cost, $1, to make decisions on their own rather than following
a rule. Figure IX shows the difference in rule selection rates across treatments.
For each of the axioms, individuals are more likely to select both the axiom and
the ¬axiom in the $1 cost treatment. The Fisher’s Exact test confirms significant
differences across treatments (p = 0.000).
Figure X shows the choice revisions in the $1 cost treatment. 51% of inconsisten-
cies are revised, which is significantly lower than the 63% in our main treatment
(Fisher’s Exact, p = 0.000). However, among reconciled choices, it is still the case
that individuals reconcile in favor of the axiom. 91% of reconciliations change lottery
choices, which is significantly higher than the 79% in the main treatment (p = 0.000).
We find a similar story for the ¬axiom revisions. 47% of inconsistencies are revised,
which is significantly lower than the 77% in the main treatment (p = 0.000). Among
the revised choices, 56% are revised in favor of the axiom, which is slightly higher
than the 44% in the main treatment (p = 0.095).
Overall, we find the same qualitative results in both treatments: Individuals find
the axioms to be normatively appealing and revise inconsistencies in favor of the ax-
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Figure X: Axiom Reconciliation Choices for $1 Cost Treatment
Figure XI: ¬Axiom Reconciliation Choices for $1 Cost Treatment
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ioms. The treatment differences do give some interesting insights into how subjects
perceive these axioms. Individuals are more willing to follow rules when it saves
them $1, which is intuitive. They are also less likely to revise inconsistent choices.
This suggests that individuals in the $0 cost treatment view selecting the axiom as
indicating that it should be “always” true, while individuals in the $1 cost treatment
view it as something that should be “mostly” true.
In Tables XII and XIII, we report the percentage of violations and direction of
reconciliation for each question.
39
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C. LOTTERIES
Table III: IIA Questions
Question Lottery A Lottery B Lottery C
60% chance of $0 80% chance of $0 80% chance of $0
IIA1 40% chance of $6 20% chance of $10 20% chance of $7
60% chance of $0 80% chance of $0 85% chance of $0
IIA2 40% chance of $6 20% chance of $10 15% chance of $10
60% chance of $0 80% chance of $0 85% chance of $0
IIA3 40% chance of $6 20% chance of $10 15% chance of $7
60% chance of $0 80% chance of $0 70% chance of $0
IIA4 40% chance of $6 20% chance of $10 30% chance of $8
Table IV: FOSD Questions (B FOSD A)
Question Lottery A Lottery B
10% chance of $1.25 5% chance of $1.25
FOSD1 5% chance of $9 5% chance of $1.50
85% chance of $9.75 90% chance of $9.75
10% chance of $2 5% chance of $2
FOSD2 5% chance of $16 5% chance of $3
85% chance of $19 90% chance of $19
21% chance of $1 1% chance of $1
FOSD3 18% chance of $10.25 19% chance of $2
61% chance of $11 80% chance of $11
21% chance of $0.50 1% chance of $0.50
FOSD4 18% chance of $13 19% chance of $4
61% chance of $16 80% chance of $16
40
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Table V: Transitivity Questions
Question Lottery A Lottery B Lottery C
30% chance of $6 30% chance of $0.50 30% chance of $8
TRANS1 30% chance of $6 30% chance of $11 30% chance of $8
40% chance of $20 40% chance of $11 40% chance of $8
45% chance of $7.50 45% chance of $1.25 45% chance of $9
TRANS2 25% chance of $7.50 25% chance of $10.50 25% chance of $9
30% chance of $19 30% chance of $10.50 30% chance of $9
Table VI: Price List Transitivity Questions
Question A B C D E F G
25% chance of $5 100% chance 100% chance 100% chance 100% chance 100% chance 100% chance
TRANS3 75% chance of $25 of $14 of $14.50 of $15 of $15.50 of $16 of $16.50
Table VII: Independence Questions
Question Lottery A Lottery B Lottery C Lottery D
80% chance of $0 80% chance of $0 10% chance of $2 10% chance of $8
BRANCH1 10% chance of $2 10% chance of $8 10% chance of $12 10% chance of $9
10% chance of $12 10% chance of $9 80% chance of $15 80% chance of $15
80% chance of $0 80% chance of $0 40% chance of $0 40% chance of $0
IND1 10% chance of $6 10% chance of $8 30% chance of $6 30% chance of $8
10% chance of $11 10% chance of $9 30% chance of $11 30% chance of $9
20% chance of $0 75% chance of $0 80% chance of $0
IND2 100% chance of $10 80% chance of $13.50 25% chance of $10 20% chance of $13.50
20% chance of $10 24% chance of $10 8% chance of $10
IND3 100% chance of $20 8% chance of $20 84% chance of $20
80% chance of $30 68% chance of $30 8% chance of $30
Table VIII: Consistency Questions
Question Lottery A Lottery B
50% chance of $3 25% chance of $5
CONS1 50% chance of $15 75% chance of $12
50% chance of $5 30% chance of $0
CONS2 50% chance of $10 70% chance of $15
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D. ADDITIONAL RESULTS
Number of ¬Axioms Selected
#Axioms
Selected 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
0 2.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 3.6%
1 0.9% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8%
2 2.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.7%
3 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 0.9% 0.0% 6.4%
4 3.6% 2.7% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.2%
5 11.8% 2.7% 1.8% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 17.3%
6 39.1% 17.3% 0.9% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 60.0%
Total 64.5% 22.7% 5.5% 1.8% 2.7% 0.9% 1.8% 100.0%
Table IX: Number of Axioms and ¬Axioms Selected
Figure XII: Pairwise Correlations in Axiom Choices for Main Treatment
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Question # of Violators # Keep Inconsistent # Revise Axiom # Revise Lotteries # Revise Both
IIA1 18 3 0 15 0
IIA2 17 2 1 13 1
IIA3 17 4 0 13 0
IIA4 11 3 0 8 0
FOSD1 59 27 11 20 1
FOSD2 55 25 12 18 0
FOSD3 48 26 11 10 1
FOSD4 32 17 7 8 0
TRANS1 6 1 2 3 0
TRANS2 3 1 0 2 0
TRANS3 32 5 0 23 4
IND1 22 7 4 11 0
IND2 37 21 4 11 1
IND3 37 17 7 11 2
BRANCH1 22 9 0 12 1
CONS1 19 1 0 14 4
CONS2 33 6 0 27 0
Table X: Number of Violations and Revisions Per Question, Conditional on Selecting
Axiom
Question # of Violators # Keep Inconsistent # Revise Axiom # Revise Lotteries # Revise Both
¬IIA1 10 3 4 2 1
¬IIA2 12 4 5 3 0
¬IIA3 11 4 6 1 0
¬IIA4 9 5 3 1 0
¬FOSD1 5 1 0 4 0
¬FOSD2 4 2 1 1 0
¬FOSD3 2 1 1 0 0
¬FOSD4 5 2 1 2 0
¬TRANS1 11 3 5 3 0
¬TRANS2 11 2 6 3 0
¬IND1 11 5 3 2 1
¬IND2 8 1 3 4 0
¬IND3 10 5 2 3 0
¬BRANCH1 8 3 3 2 0
¬CONS1 4 0 1 2 1
¬CONS2 3 0 0 2 1
Table XI: Number of Violations and Revisions Per Question, Conditional on Select-
ing ¬axiom
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Question # of Violators # Keep Inconsistent # Revise Axiom # Revise Lotteries # Revise Both
IIA1 14 3 0 11 0
IIA2 21 7 0 14 0
IIA3 18 6 0 12 0
IIA4 12 7 0 4 1
FOSD1 60 38 5 17 0
FOSD2 55 28 5 21 1
FOSD3 50 39 2 9 0
FOSD4 31 17 2 11 1
TRANS1 2 1 0 1 0
TRANS2 3 1 0 2 0
TRANS3 35 7 0 28 0
IND1 21 7 1 13 0
IND2 42 28 1 13 0
IND3 37 24 3 10 0
BRANCH1 17 6 1 10 0
CONS1 28 0 0 25 3
CONS2 22 10 0 12 0
Table XII: Number of Violations and Revisions Per Question, Conditional on Select-
ing and Violating Axiom, in $1 Cost to Decide Treatment
Question # of Violators # Keep Inconsistent # Revise Axiom # Revise Lotteries # Revise Both
¬IIA1 7 0 4 3 0
¬IIA2 4 0 3 1 0
¬IIA3 6 0 3 3 0
¬IIA4 3 0 3 0 0
¬FOSD1 6 2 1 3 0
¬FOSD2 4 4 2 2 0
¬FOSD3 12 8 2 2 0
¬FOSD4 15 8 4 3 0
¬TRANS1 23 12 4 6 1
¬TRANS2 24 14 5 5 0
¬IND1 29 21 1 7 0
¬IND2 17 11 1 3 2
¬IND3 17 10 3 4 0
¬BRANCH1 23 16 3 4 0
¬CONS1 14 5 0 7 2
¬CONS2 13 7 2 4 1
Table XIII: Number of Violations and Revisions Per Question, Conditional on Se-
lecting and Violating ¬axiom, in $1 Cost to Decide Treatment
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E. SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs. vs.
vs.
Figure XIII: IIA Rule
Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
Figure XIV: First Order Stochastic Dominance Rule
Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
vs.
Figure XV: Transitivity Rule
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Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
Figure XVI: Independence Rule
Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
Figure XVII: Branch Independence Rule
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Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
Figure XVIII: Consistency Rule
Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs. vs.
vs.
Figure XIX: Not IIA Rule
Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
Figure XX: Not First Order Stochastic Dominance Rule
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Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
vs.
Figure XXI: Not Transitivity Rule
Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
Figure XXII: Not Independence Rule
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Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
Figure XXIII: Not Branch Independence Rule
Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
Figure XXIV: Not Consistency Rule
Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
Figure XXV: Distractor Rule #1
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Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
Figure XXVI: Distractor Rule #2
Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
Figure XXVII: Distractor Rule #3
Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
vs.
Figure XXVIII: Distractor Rule #4
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Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
Figure XXIX: Distractor Rule #5
Options: You Pick: We Pick:
vs.
Figure XXX: Distractor Rule #6
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INSTRUCTIONS
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. Stanford University and the Ohio State 
University have provided the funds for this research. Feel free to ask questions while we go over the 
instructions. Please do not speak with any other participants during the experiment and please put away 
your cell phones and anything that you might have brought with you.  
This experiment has three different parts, and each part has many decisions. These instructions are for 
the first part. You will be paid based on your choice in exactly ONE randomly selected decision from the 
entire experiment. Each of your decisions is equally likely to be paid. In addition, you will receive $7 for 
completing the experiment. 
For each part, we will explain how you would be paid from a decision in that part. The decision chosen 
to determine your payment will be shown at the end of the experiment, and we will roll dice at the front 
of the room to determine which decision it will be. 
 
RULES
 
In this part of the experiment, you will be presented with various decision “rules.” These rules are 
abstract ways to represent choices, and we are interested in how people perceive them. Your task is to 
evaluate various rules and decide whether you would want to implement choices using the rule or make 
choices yourself. If you select your preferred rules carefully, will implement your preferred choices from 
the rules and you won’t have to make these choices on your own. 
The rules will use colors to represent positive money payments. These payments could be “lotteries” or 
sure payments, which we’ll describe below. The possible payments range from $0 to $30. You will 
choose whether you want the rule to make decisions for you or whether you want to make the choices 
yourself. Remember, when you evaluate these rules, you should only be considering money payments, 
and only positive amounts (meaning you can’t lose money).  
A “rule” is like an algorithm that observes your initial choices and then figures out what to pick later 
based on those initial choices. You can choose to use various rules to make your choices, or you can 
choose to make each later choice on your own. 
For example, here’s one possible rule: 
Options: You Choose: We Choose: 
 
  
vs.    
  
 
  
vs.    
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This rule establishes that, when given the choice between “black” and “white,” you chose “black.” Then, 
the rule says that if you were given the choice between “black” and “grey,” we would choose black for 
you. 
The colors don’t have any inherent meaning (e.g. grey is not “in between” black and white). They can 
represent any possible money amount or lottery. As a result, you probably wouldn’t want to select this 
rule. If you like black over white, whatever they may be, this doesn’t necessarily mean you’d like black 
over grey, since grey can represent any possible payment. Grey might be $30 and black might be $5!  
You want to select rules that would be always best for you, regardless of what the colors stand for. It’s 
worthwhile to make the choice on your own if the rule would not always be best for you, like in the 
example above. This way, if “grey” were $30, you could choose grey over black. If instead grey were $0, 
you’d be able to choose black. 
 
MIXTURES
 
Some of the rules will involve “mixtures.” Here’s an example. 
 
Options: You Choose: We Choose: 
 
  
vs.    
  
 
  
vs.    
  
 
 
 
 
This rule says that if you prefer black over grey, then you would prefer a mix of black and white to the 
same mix of grey and white.  
You can think of the mixtures like a spinner wheel. If the spinner wheel lands in the “white” region, 
you’d receive white. If it lands in the black (or grey) region, you’d receive black (or grey). Essentially, this 
rule would say that if you like black over grey, then you’d also like black-mixed-with-white over grey-
mixed-with-white, regardless of what black, white, and grey are. 
For example, imagine black and grey are both lotteries (remember, they can be any lottery), and 
imagine white is $10. If the spinner lands in the white region (which happens with probability ¼), you 
would receive $10. If it lands in the black or grey region (which happens with probability ¾), you would 
receive the original black or grey lottery. 
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Here’s another example: 
Options: You Choose: We Choose: 
 
  
vs.    
  
 
  
                          vs.    
  
 
 
 
 
Many people would find this to be a desirable rule. If you like black more than grey, you might prefer 
the mix of black-and-grey to grey. Because there’s a chance you can get black, which you prefer to grey. 
 
 
TYPES OF QUESTIONS
 
In the experiment, the colored circles will represent various lotteries. These lotteries can have any 
payments from $0 to $30, and can have any probabilities. For example, maybe one lottery is a 100% 
chance of $20. Another lottery might be a 40% chance of $5, 30% chance of $11, and 30% chance of 
$16.  
You won’t know what the exact lotteries are while you’re making your decisions about the rules, but the 
lotteries are sufficiently varied. Some might be very risky, some are safe, some involve low payments, 
some high, etc. 
Therefore, when choosing your rules, you’ll want to select only rules which are always best for you. By 
selecting rules which are always best for you, you’ll get the option which is best for you without having 
to make the decision on your own. By not selecting rules which aren’t always best for you, you’ll ensure 
that you have the opportunity to pick your most preferred option in the cases where the rule wouldn’t 
be good for you. 
 
PAYMENT
 
Along with all decisions you make in this experiment, each of your rule decisions is equally likely to be 
paid, and we will roll dice at the end of the experiment to determine which decision will be paid. If one 
of the rules is the randomly selected question to determine your payment, here’s how we would pay 
you.  
Each rule corresponds to some specific lottery questions. If you selected to make the choice on your 
own, you will be shown the lottery question(s) and you will make the choice on your own.  
If you selected to implement your choices using the rule, we will make the choice for you based on what 
the rule says.  
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You will be paid based on the lottery chosen, either by you or by the rule.  
For example, imagine you are being paid based on the following rule: 
 
Options: You Choose: We Choose: 
 
  
vs.    
  
 
  
                 +                  vs.    
  
 
+  
 
 
There would be two lotteries corresponding to “black” and “grey.” Remember, these lotteries could be 
anything, but let’s say the two lotteries were 
1. 100% chance of $12 
2. 75% chance of $20, 25% chance of $10 
Let’s say you prefer option 2 (75% chance of $20, 25% chance of $10), so think of this as “black” and the 
other (100% chance of $12) as “grey.” In this case, you preferred black over grey, as the rule assumes. 
Then, the rule says we will pay you “black & white” instead of “grey.” The white lottery also could be 
anything, say it’s 100% chance of $5. Then we would pay you “black & white,” or 75% chance of $20, 
25% chance of $10, as well as 100% chance of $5, instead of “grey,” which would have been 100% 
chance of $12. 
If you hadn’t selected this rule, you would make the choice of black + white vs. grey on your own. 
 
HOW TO ANSWER
 
There are no “right” or “wrong” answers in these questions.  We are interested in people’s preferences 
over these rules, so we simply want to know which rules you like and which you don’t. 
Since we want to know people’s true preferences, the payment is set up such that you’ll be paid your 
“favorite” thing if you answer truthfully. Therefore, you have no incentive to answer differently from 
what you really think. If you think the rule should describe your choices, you should select it (and then 
you’ll save the cost of making the decision on your own). If you think there are situations where the rule 
would not give you your favorite option, you should not select it.   
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LOTTERIES
 
In this part of experiment, you will be making choices between “lotteries.” A lottery specifies the chance 
of receiving certain payoffs. In this experiment, the possible payoffs will range from $0 to $30. The 
chance of each payoff can be anything from 0% to 100%.  
For example, one lottery could give you an 80% chance of $18, 10% chance of $7, and a 10% chance of 
$4. Another lottery might give a 100% chance of $13. There are many different possible lotteries.  
In each decision, you will see two or three lotteries on your screen. Your screen will display the written 
values for the payoffs and probabilities in a table.  
This is an example of what that could look like: 
Option A: 
 
40% chance of $5 
30% chance of $7 
30% chance of $19 
Option B: 
 
50% chance of $3 
50% chance of $25 
 
To visualize these lotteries, imagine rolling two 10-sided dice to generate a number from 1 to 100. In 
Option A, the first 40 numbers pay $5, the next 30 numbers pay $7, and the last 30 numbers pay $19. In 
Option B the first half of the numbers pay $3 and the other half pay $25. If this is the question to 
determine your payment, we would roll the dice and pay you according to which number is rolled. 
Your task is simply to choose the lottery you prefer. The computer will record your choice and then will 
bring you to the next decision. 
 
PAYMENT
 
You will be making 33 decisions. Each decision will be presented on a different screen. Along with all 
decisions you make in this experiment, each of your lottery decisions is equally likely to be paid, and we 
will roll dice at the end of the experiment to determine which decision will be paid.  
For example, in the randomly selected problem, imagine you chose the lottery which gives 
30% chance of $0 
50% chance of $11.50 
20% chance of $17 
If we roll a number 1—30, you’d receive $0. There are 30 out of 100 possible numbers between 1 and 
30, so this corresponds to a 30% chance of $0.  
If we roll a number 31—80, you’d receive $11.50. There are 50 out of 100 possible numbers between 31 
and 80, so this corresponds to a 50% chance of $11.50. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3481381
 
If we roll a number 81—100, you’d receive $17. There are 20 out of 100 possible numbers between 81 
and 100, so this corresponds to a 20% chance of $17.  
 
HOW TO ANSWER
 
Simply choose the lottery you prefer! In any given decision, if it’s the decision to determine your 
payment, we will give you the lottery you selected. So you should select the lottery that you’d rather 
have determine your payment. 
There are no “right” or “wrong” answers in these questions. We are interested in people’s preferences 
over these lotteries, so we simply want to know which lotteries you prefer. 
These lotteries are not the same questions as the lotteries which would determine your payment from 
your “rule” decisions.  
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RULES AND CHOICES
 
In the first part of the experiment, you indicated which “rules” you liked and which ones you did not 
like. In the second part of the experiment, you made choices over lotteries. It’s possible that you 
selected a rule in Part 1 which could have been applied to make one of your choices in Part 2. 
In this final part of the experiment, you will have the opportunity to reevaluate your choices. We will 
show you if you ever selected a rule and then made lottery choices which were not what the rule would 
have chosen for you. This way, you can analyze the rule and the choices together. You might decide that 
you want to change your lottery choices to align with what the rule would have chosen for you. Or you 
might decide that the rule isn’t always true of your choices, so you can “un-select” it. Or, you can leave 
your choices as they were. 
Here’s how that will work.   
 
RANKING OF THE RULES
 
First, for some of the rules you selected in Part 1, we will ask you to “rank” them in order of how much 
you would like to revise your choices if they conflict with the rule.  An example is shown on the board. 
Essentially, we are asking you to rank the rules according to how important you think they are. The rule 
you think is most important would be ranked first, the next most important would be ranked second, 
etc.  
At the bottom of the screen, there is also an option which says “I would rather have $1 than revise my 
choices for any of the remaining rules.” This is an alternative which can enter into your ranking, too. 
For example, let’s say you selected six rules. In order of importance, you rank them 
Rule 4, Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 3, Rule 6, Rule 5. 
Now suppose that you’d be willing to pay at least $1 to revise choices that conflict with rules 4, 1, 2, and 
3, but you’d rather have an extra $1 than revise choices that conflict with rules 6 and 5.  
Then, you would report a ranking of 
Rule 4, Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 3, $1, Rule 6, Rule 5. 
If this ranking question is randomly chosen for payment at the end of the experiment, we will randomly 
select two of the things you ranked. We would pay you according to whichever you ranked higher. If 
that is one of the rules, we would pay you for your revised choices in that rule (more on this below). If 
that is the $1, you would receive a $1 bonus and would be paid for your original choices.  
 
Your decision will be implemented only IF your choices are not in agreement with the rule. If your 
choices are in agreement with the rule, we will just implement your original decisions and you still get a 
$1 bonus. This means that you don’t need to worry about whether you think your choices were in 
agreement with the rule or not. If they were, your decision in these questions won’t matter (since we’ll 
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just implement your original choices). So you should report your ranking as if your choices conflict with 
the rules. 
 
REVISING YOUR CHOICES
 
Regardless of your ranking, we will show you your rule/lottery decisions and you can choose to revise 
them or not. These decisions actually could be paid if you are paid for your revised choices, as described 
above.  
To give you the opportunity to revise your choices, we will show you the rule on your screen and we’ll 
show you your choices which are inconsistent with that rule. An example is shown on the board.  
The choices you made in Parts 1 and 2 will be shown in red. Below that, you’ll see an explanation of why 
the rule would have selected something different than what you chose. To change your choice of the 
rule, just click the box containing the rule. It will change from red to grey and vice versa. To change your 
lottery decisions, just click the box of the option you prefer instead. It will turn red, also. You can change 
any of your choices as many or as few times as you wish. Your final choices will be those in red. 
You can revise your choices in any way you wish. For example, your choices being inconsistent with the 
rule might indicate that you don’t like the rule after all and it is not a rule which is always best for you. In 
that case, you could choose to “un-select” the rule. On the other hand, you might decide that the rule 
does give you things which are always best for you, and therefore you want to change your choices to 
align with the rule. Finally, you might decide that you like the rule but also like your choices, even 
though they’re inconsistent. In this case, you can leave all your choices as they are.  
In other words, you can change any of your choices or keep them the same. You are under no obligation 
to make your choices agree with the rules, or vice versa.  
 
PAYMENT
 
If one of your revised choices is selected for payment, we would pay you in the same way that we 
described in Parts 1 and 2. That is, if a revised rule were selected for payment, we would pay you just 
like how we described for the rules in Part 1. If you selected the rule in your revised choices, we would 
use the rule to make decisions for you. If you did not select the rule, you would make the decision for 
yourself. 
If a revised lottery decision were selected for payment, we would pay you the lottery you selected in 
your revised choices. We would roll dice to generate a number between 1—100 to determine which 
payoff you receive. 
 
HOW TO ANSWER
 
There are no “right” or “wrong” answers in these questions.  We are interested in people’s preferences 
over these rules and choices, so we want to know which options you prefer. 
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Since we want to know people’s true preferences, the payment is set up such that you’ll be paid your 
“favorite” thing if you answer truthfully. Therefore, you have no incentive to answer different from what 
you really think. If you think the rule should describe your choices, you should select it. If you think there 
are situations where it should not describe your choices, you should not. If you like one lottery over the 
other, you should choose that.  
Your revised rule selections or your revised lottery choices could be selected to determine your final 
payment. If this is the case, we will pay you based on your revised rule or lottery choice, as described in 
Parts 1 and 2. Therefore, since your revised choices might be selected to determine your payment, you 
should choose the options you most prefer.   
You are also under no obligation to make your lottery choices and rules agree. And, if you do want to 
change your decisions, you can change either the rule or the lottery choices depending on your 
preferences.  
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